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RECENT CASES
Liability, therefore, hinges on whether there is a foreseeable
requirement or whether the producers are responsible for all
possible injuries caused by the use of their product.
The instant case dispensed with any requirement of
foreseeability in holding that the wholesomeness of a product
should be determined by no other standard than safety. 14
Prior cases have indicated that strict liability may be
extended this far. 15  The principal case, in holding that
tobacco merits the strict liability theory and that liability is
exclusive of "human skill and foresight", has significantly
extended liability. The supplier in effect becomes an insurer
as to defects unknown and undetectable. 6
It is submitted that the real value of the decision lies
in its warning. Faced with a dilemma, the producers and
distributors of tobacco products have failed to handle the
problem in a way to which the public is entitled. The impact
of this decision should force them to seek a solution to the
problem. Failure to respond will bring upon the tobacco
industry an immediate threat of an increased financial loss
via lawsuits similar to this and a future crowded with
regulatory legislation.
NEIL A. MCEWEN
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - IGNORANCE OF C A U S E
OF ACTION - DOES IGNORANCE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION? -While p 1 a i n tiff
was hospitalized in 1944, a product manufactured by defendant
was injected into his nasal sinuses for the purpose of making
them perceptible in X-rays. In 1957 plaintiff learned that
this substance had caused a cancerous condition in his nose
and he brought an action based on negligence and breach of
warranty. The New York Court of Appeals held, two justices
14. Green v. American Tobacco Co., mupra note 13 at 173.
15. Pietrus v. Watkins Co., Kupra note 5, at 802 quoting 46 Am. Jur. Sales
806 (1943). ". . . the manufacturer as a rule will be charged with notice
of the quality of the article that he himself has made, and cannot excuse
himself upon the ground that he did not know its dangerous qualities."
16. See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792.
795 (1954) (bad blood); See generally 1 Frumer & Friedmann," PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, § 16.03(4) (1961).
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dissenting, that the action was barred by the statutes of
limitation applicable to actions for negligence and breach of
warranty. The dissent thought it unreasonable to hold that
plaintiff's cause of action had expired before it was possible
for him to learn of the wrong. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142 (1963).
The general rule is that mere ignorance of one's rights
will not toll statutes of limitation, but they begin to run from
the moment the cause of action accrues.1  Some courts
believe the occasional hardship resulting from the application
of this rule is outweighed by the advantage of outlawing
stale claims.
2
Because of the harshness of the general rule, several
jurisdictions have suspended the running of the statute in
cases of fraudulent concealment, 3  continuing trespass,4
infancy5 and insanity.6  One or more of these exceptions
have been codified in many states.7  A few jurisdictions
hold that statutes of limitation do not run until actual notice
of the wrongful act.8  This extension of the general rule
is based on two propositions; (1) it is inequitable to prevent
relief to an injured party who was without notice of any
negligent act that could cause injury,' and (2) legislatures
did not intend such consequences to be reconciled with the
traditional purpose of statutes of limitation."°  In support of
these propositions one court has held statutes of limitation
do not begin to run until knowledge of the damage is
acquired.'
1. Cristiane v. City of Sarasota, 65 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1953); Richmond
Redev. & Housing Authority v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 195 Va. 827. 80
S.E.2d 574 (1954).
2. Kennedy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 135 Conn. 176, 62 A.2d 771,
773 (1948); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200
N.E. 824 (1936).
3. Scarborough v. Atlantic C. L. R.R., 178 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1949).
4. Speth v. City of Madison, 248 Wis. 492, 22 N.'W.2d 501 (1946).
5. Hansen v. Lindell, 14 Wash. 643, 192 P.2d 234 (1942).
6. In re Goldberg's Estate, 288 Ill. App. 203, 5 N.E.2d 863 (1937).,
7. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 328, 338 (1954); Mass. Ann. Laws
c. 260 § 12, 25 (1959); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 28-01-24, 25 (1961).
8. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) where a disease was
caused by dust inhalation over a period of years; City of Miami v. Brooks,
70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954) where the statute was tolled until the dis-
covery of an old x-ray injury; Sharon v. Kansas City Granite & Monument
Co., 233 Mo. App. 547, 125 S.W.2d 959 (1939) which suspended the statute
until the conversion of the stock was discovered.
9. City of Miami v. Brooks, supm note 8, at 309.
10. Urie v. Thompson, supra note 8, at 170.
11. Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955).
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Generally where the warranty is as to suitability of the
product sold, the limitation runs from the date of sale.12
If the warranty relates to a future event by which its truth
can be ascertained, the statute begins to run as of the time
of that event.13 However, there are a few cases treating a
false warranty as a fraud and holding that the running of the
statute is postponed until the fraud is discovered or might
be discovered in the exercise of ordinary diligence.'
4
It is submitted that the general rule is too harsh and
should be liberalized. By postponing the running of the
statute of limitation until notice of the negligent act or the
breach of warranty is acquired, parties who, through no fault
of their own are ignorant of their rights, would be accorded
more equitable treatment.
KENNETH R. NORGAARD
12. Brackett v. Martens, 4 Cal. App. 249, 87 Pac. 410 (1906); Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S2d 707 (1945); Thurston
Motor Line, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962).
13. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 573. 360 P.2d
897 (1961); Inglalls v. Angell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913) Herein
there was a warranty that fruit trees would bear a certain type of fruit.
The warranty was breached when it was demonstrated the trees did not
bear such fruit, and limitations ran from that time.
14. Dye v. Farm Mortgage Inv. Co. of Topeka, Kan., 74 F.2d 395 (10th
Cir. 1934); Anding v. Perkins, 29 Tex. 348 (1867); Cunningham v. Frontier
Lumber Co., 245 S.W. 270 (Tex. 1922).
